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Winning the Waiting Game: How Oklahoma Can Rectify
the Discrepancy Between Its No-Impeachment Rule and
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado
Juror 8: “It’s always difficult to keep personal prejudice out of a
thing like this. And whenever you run into it, prejudice always
obscures the truth.”1
I. Introduction
For most people, the jury room remains a mystery. What is known:
twelve semi-randomly chosen jurors enter the jury room, discuss the merits
and arguments of a case, decide the fate of each party, and leave the room
to have their decision announced publicly.2 What is generally not known,
however, is the deliberation leading to that decision. What happens within
the physical walls of the jury room varies in each case because the inputs—
such as the jurors and the facts—are different in each case.3
Even more arcane are the inner workings within the mind of each juror.
While each juror must decide the case according to the evidence established
in the record, it is nearly impossible to keep personal feelings or proclivities
from creeping in. For that reason, society and the law do not require jurors
to be robotic arbiters4—devoid of emotions or predilections. But, according
to the Sixth Amendment, criminal defendants have the right to a fair and
impartial trial.5 Consequently, at what point does a juror’s reasoning, or
basis of reasoning, infringe upon a criminal defendant’s constitutional
right?
Imagine the following scenario: A Native American defendant, in
Oklahoma, is charged with criminal assault stemming from a barroom
brawl. The prosecution has admitted credible evidence that the defendant
consumed alcohol on the night in question, but the amount or extent of
alcohol consumed is unclear. Moreover, the issue in the case turns on

1. 12 ANGRY MEN (MGM Studios 1957).
2. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3 (1966).
3. See id. at 464 (recognizing “that no two juries, and for that matter no two judges, are
alike” while trying to determine whether one can “connect the background characteristics of
juries and judges with their decisions”).
4. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984)
(explaining that the Sixth Amendment requires “a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there
are no perfect trials”).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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whether the defendant instigated the fight or merely responded in selfdefense. After a two-day trial, the defendant is found guilty.
Several days after the trial, a juror approaches the public defender tasked
with representing the defendant and explains that she is having second
thoughts about the verdict. She also mentions that Juror No. 3 dominated
the deliberations and expressed racially charged statements about the
defendant. More specifically, Juror No. 3 said he lived in a community with
a large population of Native Americans and insisted that “when Indians get
alcohol, they all get drunk, and when they get drunk, they get violent”;
therefore, the defendant must have started the fight. Despite initial
reservations from some jurors, Juror No. 3 managed to persuade the few
remaining holdouts to convict the defendant.
The public defender, aghast by this revelation, does not believe his client
received a fair and impartial trial and thereafter begins drafting a motion for
a new trial. Unfortunately, after the public defender consults Oklahoma’s
evidence code, he realizes that Oklahoma law prohibits jurors from
testifying about what transpires in the jury room in order to impeach the
verdict, except in a few, unrelated circumstances involving extraneous
influences.
A public defender in that hypothetical,6 burdened with a seemingly
endless caseload, might stop there and decide against filing a motion for a
new trial because the evidence rules provide no remedy. And until 2017, an
attorney in such a case was right: there was no remedy. But, in PeñaRodriguez v. Colorado, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment requires that a juror be able to testify as to another juror’s
overt statements of racial bias or animus if those statements were a
significant factor in reaching the verdict.7 Because Peña-Rodriguez was
based on the Sixth Amendment, Oklahoma’s evidence rule, Rule 2606(B),8
which mirrors the language of the federal rule barring juror testimony, was
also deemed unconstitutional when applied to cases involving displays of
6. The preceding hypothetical was largely, but loosely, based on United States v.
Benally, 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.
Ct. 855 (2017). In Benally, the facts were different—e.g., the case was in federal court
because the defendant had allegedly assaulted a Bureau of Indian Affairs officer—but the
juror’s statements are mostly recited verbatim. See id. at 1231–32. In that case, the Tenth
Circuit held that a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated when jurors
expressed racial bias during deliberations and that evidence of the racial bias was precluded
by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). See id. at 1241. Contra Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at
869.
7. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
8. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2606(B) (2011).
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overt racism in the jury room. Unfortunately, however, neither Rule
2606(B) nor Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 606(b) has been updated to
reflect this significant change in the law—perpetuating a waiting game.
This Comment highlights the conflict between the newly created racialbias exception and Rule 2606(B), as well as FRE 606(b), and provides
Oklahoma’s lawmakers with recommendations for rectifying that
discrepancy. By adopting these recommendations, Oklahoma can set an
example for other jurisdictions to follow and, in the process, win the
waiting game. Part II explores the historical treatment of the noimpeachment rule, beginning with the English common law and
culminating in its codification into the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
Oklahoma adopted. Part III reviews the two prominent U.S. Supreme Court
cases interpreting FRE 606(b)—prior to Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado—that
rejected constitutional challenges to the rule. Part IV examines the groundbreaking Peña-Rodriguez decision and the newly created exception to the
no-impeachment rule. Part V discusses the immediate and long-term effects
of Peña-Rodriguez and explains the reasons for the reluctance of the
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence (Advisory Committee) to
amend FRE 606(b). Finally, Part VI provides Oklahoma lawmakers with
alternative amendments to rectify the unconstitutionality of Rule 2606(b).
II. The Law Before Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado
A. The Common Law Development of the No-Impeachment Rule
Traditionally, the jury deliberation room has been considered a black
box9 because, in theory, “no one should be a witness to his own
misconduct.”10 The treatment of jury deliberations and the protection of
verdicts from juror impeachment in America traces its lineage back to the
English common law. Before the case of Vaise v. Delaval,11 English courts
admitted juror testimony to invalidate verdicts if the testimony contained
evidence of juror misconduct.12 In 1785, however, Lord Mansfield upheld
9. See Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room . . .
but Should It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b), 60 UCLA L. REV. 262, 289 (2012) (“The jury room is meant to be a black box, and
what happens in the jury room is meant to stay there.”).
10. Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 360, 360 (1958); see
Note, Evidence: Impeachment of Verdict When Jurors Obtain Independent Information, 10
DUKE L.J. 149, 149–50 (1961).
11. 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785); see Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863.
12. See Benjamin T. Huebner, Note, Beyond Tanner: An Alternative Framework for
Postverdict Juror Testimony, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1469, 1472 (2006).
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the Vaise verdict notwithstanding the evidence that the jurors reached their
verdict by chance.13 Lord Mansfield’s opinion—in its entirety—held that:
The Court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the
jurymen themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a very high
misdemeanor: but in every such case the Court must derive their
knowledge from some other source: such as from some person
having seen the transaction through a window, or by some such
other means.14
Thus, the Mansfield rule, as it became known, broadly prohibited juror
testimony.15 More colloquially, the Mansfield rule provided that “a juror
cannot impeach his own verdict,”16 and the policy behind this rule
highlighted the inherent untrustworthiness in a juror testifying about his
own misconduct.17 Because of Lord Mansfield’s influence on early
jurisprudence, the Mansfield rule gained notoriety and broad
implementation throughout both England and the American colonies.18
Despite the Mansfield rule’s broad acceptance, it never received
universal adherence, especially in America.19 For example, in the 1852 case
of United States v. Reid, the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned that “cases
might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse [juror testimony]
without violating the plainest principles of justice.”20 The Court, however,
ultimately applied the no-impeachment rule and excluded juror affidavits
testifying that a juror received and read an outside newspaper.21 But the
primary divergence from the Mansfield rule came from Iowa in 1866.22
13. In other words, “the jury broke their deadlock by ‘toss[ing] up’ (i.e., by casting
lots).” Id. (alterations in original); see Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and
the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b)
Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 513 (1988).
14. John L. Rosshirt, Note, Evidence—Admissibility of Jurors’ Affidavits to Impeach
Jury Verdict, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 484, 484 (1956) (quoting Vaise, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep.
944) (emphasis added).
15. See Huebner, supra note 12, at 1472–73; see also Jack Pope, The Mental Operations
of Jurors, 40 TEX. L. REV. 849, 849 (1962) (noting that Lord Mansfield created the rule in
the eighteenth century that prohibited jurors for testifying about their own misconduct).
16. See, e.g., Rosshirt, supra note 14, at 484; Comment, supra note 10, at 361.
17. See Crump, supra note 13, at 513.
18. See B.M.K., Note, Jurors—Impeachment of Verdict, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 86, 86
(1915).
19. See Huebner, supra note 12, at 1473; Crump, supra note 13, at 514–15.
20. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 366 (1851).
21. Id. at 367.
22. See Huebner, supra note 12, at 1473.
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In Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., the Iowa Supreme
Court explicitly rejected the Mansfield rule23 and adopted what became
known as the “Iowa rule.”24 This new rule permitted courts to receive juror
affidavits “to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room,
which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself[.]”25 In effect, the
Iowa rule allowed jurors to testify about objective facts that occurred in the
jury room because, the Iowa Supreme Court reasoned, other jurors could
easily dispute or corroborate the juror’s testimony. 26 Inversely, the Iowa
rule prohibited jurors from testifying about “subjective facts such as the
effect of overt acts upon a juror’s thinking.”27 As a result, a minority of
states followed suit, adopting the Iowa rule.28
Thereafter, the Mansfield rule and the Iowa rule competed in American
common law.29 The U.S. Supreme Court applied the Iowa rule twice30 but
ultimately decided against adopting the Iowa rule at the federal level in
McDonald v. Pless.31 In doing so, however, the Court again expressed its
foreshadowing refrain from Reid—this time, that a juror’s own testimony
may be necessary “in the gravest and most important cases.”32 Despite this
ambiguous forewarning, the Court recognized the no-impeachment rule as
the law of the land, and the McDonald holding, known over time as “the
federal rule,” prevailed throughout the twentieth century.33
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See 20 Iowa 195, 211–13 (1866).
See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 863 (2017).
Wright, 20 Iowa at 210.
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863.
Note, Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors—Rule of Evidence 606(b), 4 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 420 (1978).
28. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865 (noting, as of 2017, nine states have adopted
the Iowa rule); see also Huebner, supra note 12, at 1474 (commenting that the Iowa rule
“gained broad acceptance” but only supporting this claim by stating that “[a]t least twelve
states adopted the rule”).
29. See Crump, supra note 13, at 517–20.
30. See, e.g., Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 382–84 (1912); Mattox v. United
States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892).
31. 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915); see Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 46–47 (2014) (“This
Court occasionally employed language that might have suggested a preference for the Iowa
rule. But to the extent that these decisions created any question as to which approach this
Court followed, McDonald v. Pless largely settled matters. There, we held that juror
affidavits were not admissible to show that jurors had entered a ‘quotient’ verdict, precisely
the opposite of the result reached by the Iowa Supreme Court in its decision establishing the
Iowa approach.”) (internal citations omitted).
32. McDonald, 238 U.S. at 269; see supra text accompanying note 20.
33. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 876 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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B. FRE 606(b)—The Codification of the No-Impeachment Rule
During the first half of the twentieth century, several organizations
attempted to codify common-law evidence rules, but no effort was
successful34 until the Advisory Committee was appointed.35 After the
Advisory Committee was formed to develop what ultimately became the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the Committee had to decide whether to codify
the federal no-impeachment rule or the Iowa rule. The Advisory
Committee’s first draft favored a more liberal rule, comparable to the Iowa
rule;36 however, the Committee ultimately scrapped that approach. The
proposed rule, which the Advisory Committee sent to Congress for
confirmation, reflected the McDonald approach.37 The debate over the
proper standard did not end there. The U.S. House of Representatives
passed a bill incorporating the Iowa rule into the federal evidence code,38
but the U.S. Senate declined to adopt that version39 and instead instituted
FRE 606(b), mirroring the federal rule.40
Currently, FRE 606(b) prohibits the use of juror testimony to impeach a
verdict, specifically foreclosing testimony about the inner workings and
deliberations inside the jury room, except in three narrow instances. Under
the rule, jurors may testify when:
34. See Michael S. Ariens, The Law of Evidence and the Idea of Progress, 25 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 853, 858–63 (1992) (discussing early codification efforts by, namely, the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
35. Id. at 863–64.
36. See Crump, supra note 13, at 520; see also Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864.
37. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 265
(1972); see Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864; see also Crump, supra note 13, at 520–21
(“The Advisory Committee’s final proposal, which eventually was adopted by the Supreme
Court, added the restriction, taken from Mattox and Woodward, that jurors were not
competent to testify about any occurrences or statements made during deliberations . . . .”)
(internal citations omitted).
38. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. NO. 93650, at 9–10 (1973), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.S. FED. R. EVID. App. 1, at 167–68 (Law. Co-op.
1975); see Crump, supra note 13, at 521; see also FED. R. EVID. 606 advisory committee’s
note to subdivision (b).
39. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. NO. 931277, at 56 (1974), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.S. FED. R. EVID. App. 2, at 203–04 (Law. Co-op.
1975); see Crump, supra note 13, at 521; see also FED. R. EVID. 606 advisory committee’s
note to subdivision (b).
40. See Wolin, supra note 9, at 271–72; see also id. at 271 n.37 (discussing the 2006
amendment, which created an exception in cases where a mistake was made on the verdict
form, as well the 2011 amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which restyled the rule
to make them more legible and accessible).
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(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought
to the jury’s attention;
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any
juror; or
(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict
form.41
Like many states, Oklahoma’s comparable Rule 2606(B)42 is a near wordfor-word copy of FRE 606(b), and its adoption of the rule in 2002 did not
significantly change the state’s common-law treatment of juror testimony. 43

41. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). In its entirety, FRE 606(b) reads as follows:
(b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment.
(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any
statement made or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations; the
effect of anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's
mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not
receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters.
(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention;
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or
(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.
Id.
42. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2606(B) (2011). In its entirety, section 2606(B) reads as follows:
B. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror shall not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or as to the effect of anything upon the juror's mind or another
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the
verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes during
deliberations. A juror may testify on the question whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
An affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter
about which the juror would be precluded from testifying shall not be received
for these purposes.
Id. In 2006, FRE 606(b) added a third exception for mistakes on verdict forms, which
Oklahoma has not adopted. See FED. R. EVID. 606 advisory committee’s note on the 2006
amendment to amended rule 606(b); cf. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2606(B).
43. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2606(B) Evidence Subcommittee’s Note (“As to § 606(B)
relating to inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, does not change Oklahoma law
significantly.”).
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Therefore, in Oklahoma, trial courts exclude juror testimony if it does not
fit one of the narrow exceptions.44
III. Supreme Court Interpretation of FRE 606(b)
Since the codification of the no-impeachment rule, the Supreme Court
has rarely had to interpret FRE 606(b). The two cases in which the Court
interpreted and applied FRE 606(b), prior to Peña-Rodriguez, are Tanner v.
United States and Warger v. Shauers.45 In each case, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld a broad application of the no-impeachment rule and failed to
find additional exceptions to the rule.
A. Tanner v. United States
1. Background
In Tanner,46 defendants Anthony Tanner and William Conover were
each found guilty on one count of defrauding the United States and various
counts of mail fraud.47 The defendants’ charges arose out of shady
contractual dealings involving the construction of a coal-fired power plant
and an accompanying patrol road by Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. 48
Because both projects were backed by a federal loan, criminal charges were
brought in federal court.49 After a hung jury in an initial trial, a subsequent
trial with a different jury found both defendants guilty.50
2. Post-Trial Motions
After the trial but before the defendants were sentenced, one of the
jurors, on her own, called Tanner’s attorney to inform him that multiple
jurors had consumed alcohol during recesses and had slept through portions
44. Given Rule 2606(B)’s broad prohibition, Oklahoma courts have rarely addressed the
effect of a juror’s racial bias in relation to post-verdict inquiries. But in 2012, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that a juror’s racial bias was unconstitutional; however, the court
qualified its holding under the extremely narrow facts of that case. See Fields v. Saunders,
2012 OK 17, ¶¶ 12–15, 278 P.3d 577, 581–82. Despite the holding, the court “stress[ed] that
this is a fact specific case of juror bias and not a case of a juror impeaching a verdict”—thus
distinguishing the case from one involving Rule 2606(B). Id. ¶ 13, 278 P.3d at 581.
45. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 866 (2017) (“[S]ince the
enactment of Rule 606(b), the Court has addressed the precise question whether the
Constitution mandates [a racial bias] exception to it in just two instances.”).
46. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
47. Id. at 112–13.
48. See id. at 110–13.
49. Id. at 112.
50. Id. at 112–13.
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of the trial.51 Tanner’s attorney filed several motions, including one for a
new trial, but the district court judge found the juror testimony
“inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) to impeach the jury's
verdict.”52 Instead, the judge invited additional evidence—not in the form
of juror testimony—to determine whether a new trial should be granted.53
Upon review, the judge again ruled that the testimony was inadmissible, so
the defendants appealed.54
While on appeal, Tanner’s attorney received another unsolicited
statement by a juror, attesting a similar story as the first juror’s statement.55
This time, however, the juror gave more details into what he described as
“one big party.”56 The juror alleged that
(1) at least seven jurors, including himself, had consumed alcohol,
including pitchers of beers, liters of wine, and multiple mixed
drinks;
(2) four jurors, including himself, “smoked marijuana quite
regularly” throughout the trial;
(3) two jurors ingested cocaine several times each;
(4) one juror sold another juror “a quarter pound of marijuana”; and
(5) one juror “took marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia into
the courthouse.”57
According to the juror, he came forward “to clear [his] conscience” because
he believed “Mr. Tanner should have a better opportunity to get somebody
that would review the facts right.”58
Despite the shocking allegations, the district court denied a new trial, and
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.59
3. Supreme Court Affirms
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions holding that
juror intoxication is not considered an extraneous influence and that
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 113.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id. (quoting and citing the juror’s affidavit).
Id. at 115–16 (quoting and citing the juror’s affidavit).
Id. at 116 (quoting and citing the juror’s affidavit).
Id.; see United States v. Conover, 772 F.2d 765, 767 (11th Cir. 1985).
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multiple trial safeguards already protect defendants from juror
misconduct.60 In rejecting Tanner’s demand for juror testimony, the Court
also relied upon the significant public policy concerns supporting the noimpeachment rule.61
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor first looked to whether the
alleged juror misconduct fit one of the exceptions of FRE 606(b)62—
namely, whether juror intoxication is an “external influence.”63 In Mattox v.
United States, the Supreme Court first recognized an exception for
“extraneous influence[s]” on juries.64 Since then, federal courts have “used
this external/internal distinction to identify those instances in which juror
testimony impeaching a verdict would be admissible.”65 Courts applying
this framework have held that “allegations of the physical or mental
incompetence of a juror [are] ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ matters.”66
In particular, the Court highlighted the case of United States v.
Dioguardi.67 In Dioguardi, a juror wrote a letter to the defendant, post-trial,
telling him she had clairvoyant abilities and knew he was a good man,
despite his being guilty.68 The defense sought to impeach the verdict,
alleging the juror’s incompetence as evidenced by her self-professed
supernatural powers in her letter,69 but the court denied relief.70 The Second
Circuit affirmed and concluded that generally “courts have refused to set
aside a verdict, or even to make further inquiry, unless there be proof of an
adjudication of insanity or mental incompetence closely in advance . . . .”71
Therefore, juror intoxication does not rise to the level of misconduct or
incompetence such that it may be deemed an outside influence.72
Next, the Court discussed the substantial policy concerns in favor of
limiting juror testimony except in cases of outside influence. Primarily, the
Supreme Court focused on the concerns it first noted in McDonald in 1915:
60. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121–27.
61. See id. at 119–21, 127.
62. See id. at 117–19.
63. See id. at 117–18.
64. Id. at 117 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892)); see also
cases cited supra note 30.
65. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117.
66. Id. at 118.
67. Id. at 118–19.
68. See United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 75–78 (2d Cir. 1974).
69. See id. at 75 n.7 (reciting the juror’s letter in full).
70. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 118.
71. Id. at 119 (quoting Dioguardi, 492 F.2d at 80).
72. See id. at 122.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/6

2020]

COMMENTS

413

[j]urors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an
effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might
establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence
thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make
what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant
subject of public investigation—to the destruction of all
frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.73
The Court confirmed that those policy considerations still existed74 and
expressed concerns that post-verdict “[a]llegations of juror misconduct”
would substantially disrupt the finality of verdicts.75 Despite conceding that
post-verdict investigations into jury deliberations would prove helpful in
some cases, the Court concluded that “[i]t is not at all clear, however, that
the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.”76 Therefore, public
policy weighed in favor of prohibiting juror testimony of juror misconduct
in order to prevent juror harassment, encourage full and frank jury
deliberations, and promote the finality of verdicts.
Finally, the Court considered the constitutional challenge to the criminal
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial.77 The Court
determined that four trial safeguards protect a criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right—apart from juror testimony. The first line of defense
against juror misconduct is voir dire, during which counsel for both parties
can assess a prospective juror’s competence and can accept or reject jurors
accordingly.78 Second, during trial, jurors are “observable by the court, by
counsel, and by court personnel.”79 Consequently, finality issues are
negated if the court learns of the misconduct and remedies it before the
verdict is decided.80 Third, jurors observe each other and are made aware of
73. Id. at 120 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267–68 (1915)); see supra
notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
74. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120.
75. Id. (“Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for
the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the
process.”) (citing Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1081 (3d Cir. 1985)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 127.
78. Id. Though, it is worth noting that jurors shall not be excluded because of their race.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); see also discussion infra notes 190–201
(explaining how Batson may play a role in the development of Peña-Rodriguez
jurisprudence).
79. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127 (citing United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 996–97
(3d Cir. 1980)).
80. See id.
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procedures for reporting any misconduct prior to deliberations.81 Lastly,
parties may still seek to impeach a verdict using “nonjuror evidence,” 82
which the trial judge invited Tanner’s attorney to provide after rejecting the
initial juror’s testimony.83 Because these safeguards were in place, the
Court reasoned Tanner’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated. After
establishing that the aforementioned trial safeguards insulated Tanner’s
Sixth Amendment right and that juror intoxication is not an extraneous
influence, the Supreme Court held that the juror testimony was correctly
excluded.84
B. Warger v. Shauers
The Supreme Court’s holding in Tanner unified lower courts’
approaches to post-verdict inquiries,85 and the Court did not interpret FRE
606(b) or comparable state rules until Warger v. Shauers86 in 2014.
1. Trial Level and on Appeal
While riding his motorcycle in South Dakota, Gregory Warger was
struck from behind by a truck driven by Randy Shauers.87 Warger suffered
devastating injuries as a result of the accident, including the loss of his
leg.88 Both parties claimed the other was at fault, and “Warger sued Shauers
for negligence” in a civil trial.89
The jury found in favor of Shauers, who was driving the truck.90 Shortly
after the trial, however, one juror informed the plaintiff’s counsel that the
foreperson, Regina Whipple, expressed pro-defendant views in the
deliberation room.91 According to the juror’s affidavit, Whipple admitted
that her daughter had been at fault in a similar vehicle accident.92
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
84. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127.
85. See Huebner, supra note 12, at 1487–90 (discussing how Tanner’s “framework has
gained widespread acceptance in the states” and how “once there was a diversity of
approaches to the admissibility of juror testimony, with each state balancing fairness to the
litigants with the important goal of protecting the jury system, there is now staid uniformity
and little experimentation”).
86. 574 U.S. 40 (2014).
87. Id. at 42.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 43.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Specifically, the juror alleged Whipple even said that “if her daughter had
been sued, it would have ruined her life.”93
Before the jury was empaneled, during voir dire, counsel extensively
questioned prospective jurors about whether they would be able to be fair
and impartial in a civil negligence case.94 For each question, Whipple
answered affirmatively that she could be an impartial juror.95 Thus, upon
hearing of Whipple’s pro-defendant bias, Warger’s counsel sought a new
trial because Whipple likely would have not been empaneled had she told
the truth during voir dire.96 The district court denied Warger’s motion for a
new trial because the juror’s testimony did not fit one of FRE 606(b)’s
exceptions.97
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the juror’s testimony of
Whipple’s bias did not fit the definition of “extraneous prejudicial
information,” as found in FRE 606(b)(2)(A).98 The Eighth Circuit reasoned
that prejudices and biases are personal and, therefore, internal rather than
external evidence.99 Furthermore, despite a circuit split on this issue, the
Eighth Circuit sided with the majority of circuit courts in holding that FRE
606(b) applies to juror evidence “that a juror lied during voir dire.”100
2. Supreme Court Affirms
The Supreme Court applied a straight-forward analysis to this case. First,
FRE 606(b) applies to “inquir[ies] into the validity of a verdict.”101 Second,
moving for a new trial because a juror lied during voir dire is “plainly” an
inquiry into the jury’s verdict.102 Third, FRE 606(b) applies, so the evidence

93. Id. (quoting the juror’s affidavit).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The basis of the plaintiff’s motion for new trial was that the juror’s affidavit
satisfied the requirements of McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, which
requires a party to “demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on
voir dire, and . . . that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge
for cause.” Id. (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556
(1984)). But, before the plaintiff could even prove that the juror’s affidavit fulfilled the
McDonough requirements, the juror’s testimony had to be admitted under FRE 606(b). See
id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 44.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1)).
102. Id. at 44–45.
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must fit one of FRE 606(b)’s three exceptions.103 In this case, the Supreme
Court held that the juror’s testimony of Whipple’s alleged pro-defendant
bias did not fit any of the exceptions.104
Despite couching its opinion in simplistic terms at times,105 the Court
supplied a robust discussion of why FRE 606(b) applied in this situation
and why the juror’s testimony should be excluded. The Court began its
analysis by reciting the history of the no-impeachment rule leading up to
the codification of FRE 606(b).106 By adopting the narrower federal rule,
the Court reasoned, Congress purposely chose to exclude all juror
testimony that did not meet one of FRE 606(b)’s exceptions, when offered
during an inquiry into the validity of a verdict.107 Therefore, the Court’s
analysis of “simply accord[ing] Rule 606(b)’s terms their plain meaning”108
aligned with courts’ traditional treatment juror testimonies.109
Next, the Court rejected two of Warger’s theories. First, Warger argued
that the focus of his motion for a new trial was on voir dire because
Whipple allegedly lied during voir dire.110 Thus, vacating the verdict is the
only remedy to rectify the wrong that transpired during voir dire.111 But the
Court disagreed with Warger because the language of FRE 606(b)—
“[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict”112—simply means
“during a proceeding in which the verdict may be rendered invalid.”113
Second, Warger argued that civil litigants, like criminal defendants, have
a right to an impartial trial.114 Accordingly, Warger’s constitutional right,
which is largely protected by voir dire,115 compels admittance of juror
testimony in this case.116 To refute this argument, the Court again pointed to
103. See id.
104. Id. at 51.
105. See, e.g., id. at 44 (stating that, in announcing the holding of the case, the Court
“simply accord[s] Rule 606(b)’s terms their plain meaning”) (emphasis added); id. at 48
(stating that the plaintiff “seek[s] to rebut this straightforward understanding of Rule
606(b)”) (emphasis added).
106. See id. at 45–48; see also discussion supra Part II.
107. Warger, 574 U.S. at 48.
108. Id. at 44.
109. See id. at 45–48.
110. Id. at 48–49.
111. Id.
112. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
113. Warger, 574 U.S. at 49.
114. Id. at 50.
115. See id. (citing Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986) (plurality opinion); Ham v.
South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973)).
116. Id.
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the common-law history and language of FRE 606(b), which lacks any
ambiguity.117 But more importantly, the Court’s decision in Tanner
supplied the answer:118 the safeguards detailed in Tanner,119 including voir
dire, protect a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.120 Therefore,
even if one safeguard is allegedly compromised, the remaining safeguards
still protect a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.121
Ultimately, the Court held that the juror’s testimony did not fit the FRE
606(b)(2)(A) exception.122 Moreover, by applying the Tanner analysis to
this civil case and by precluding the juror’s testimony, the Supreme Court
affirmed that the no-impeachment rule does not violate the Sixth
Amendment.123
IV. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado
Tanner and Warger appeared to foreclose arguments that the
Constitution compels post-verdict juror testimony about juror misconduct in
the deliberation room. But the Supreme Court reversed course in PeñaRodriguez v. Colorado.124 The issue presented in Peña-Rodriguez was
whether one juror may testify about another juror’s statements
demonstrating overt racial bias or animus to impeach a verdict, when those
statements played a significant role in reaching the verdict.125 The Supreme
Court ruled affirmatively, holding FRE 606(b) and comparable state
statutes unconstitutional when applied to cases involving racist statements
made by jurors during deliberation.126 Peña-Rodriguez marked a significant
117. Id.
118. Id. (“[A]ny claim that Rule 606(b) is unconstitutional in circumstances such as these
is foreclosed by our decision in Tanner.”).
119. See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
120. Warger, 574 U.S. at 51.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. (“In Tanner, we concluded that Rule 606(b) precluded a criminal defendant
from introducing evidence that multiple jurors had been intoxicated during trial, rejecting the
contention that this exclusion violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right[.] . . .
Similarly here, a party's right to an impartial jury remains protected despite Rule 606(b)'s
removal of one means of ensuring that jurors are unbiased. Even if jurors lie in voir dire in a
way that conceals bias, juror impartiality is adequately assured by the parties' ability to bring
to the court's attention any evidence of bias before the verdict is rendered, and to employ
nonjuror evidence even after the verdict is rendered.”).
124. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
125. See id. at 861.
126. Id. at 869.
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shift in the no-impeachment rule and may have profound constitutional
effects moving forward.
A. The State Trial
In 2007, Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez, a Hispanic man, was charged
with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault of
two teenage sisters.127 Both sisters identified the defendant as their
assailant.128 Before the jury was empaneled, prospective jurors were given a
written questionnaire asking them, inter alia, if “there [is] anything about
you that you feel would make it difficult for you to be a fair juror in this
case?”129 Moreover, at voir dire, prospective jurors were asked whether they
had any reason why they could not be impartial in this trial, and “[n]one of
the empaneled jurors expressed any reservations based on racial or any
other bias.”130 After the trial and subsequent jury deliberation, the jury
found the defendant guilty.131
B. Jurors Come Forward—Motion for New Trial
After the jury rendered the verdict, however, two jurors approached the
defense counsel and said privately that another juror, Juror H.C., had made
racially biased statements about the defendant and his alibi witness.132 With
approval by the court, the defense counsel obtained sworn affidavits from
the two jurors testifying to the following:
H.C. told the other jurors that he “believed the defendant was
guilty because, in [H.C.'s] experience as an ex-law enforcement
officer, Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe
they could do whatever they wanted with women.” The jurors
reported that H.C. stated his belief that Mexican men are
physically controlling of women because of their sense of
entitlement, and further stated, “‘I think he did it because he's
Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.’”
According to the jurors, H.C. further explained that, in his

127. Id. at 861.
128. Id.
129. Peña-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015); see Peña-Rodriguez,
137 S. Ct. at 861.
130. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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experience, “nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of
being aggressive toward women and young girls.”133
Finally, the jurors testified that Juror H.C. disputed the credibility of the
defendant’s Hispanic alibi witness because he was in the country illegally,
which was later proven false.134
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the trial court recognized the
juror’s evident bias but denied the motion because Colorado Rule of
Evidence 606(b)—which is modeled after FRE 606(b)—does not permit
juror testimony concerning such evidence.135 Thereafter, the Colorado
Court of Appeals and the Colorado Supreme Court both affirmed the trial
court’s denial.136
C. Justice Kennedy’s Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Colorado Supreme
Court and created a new exception to FRE 606(b) in cases “where a juror
makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes
or animus to convict a criminal defendant[.]”137 Specifically, the Court held
that “the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way
in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s
statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.”138
Justice Kennedy commenced the Court’s analysis by reciting the history
of the no-impeachment rule leading up to the modern-day codification of
FRE 606(b),139 as well as precedent cases involving juror testimony.140 The
Court emphasized the history of the no-impeachment rule by charting the
courses of two historical approaches to juror testimony. 141 Moreover,
though the Federal Rules of Evidence codified the common law and a
majority of states had adopted that rule, the Court noted that at least sixteen
states142 and three federal circuit courts143 had recognized an exception

133. Id. at 862 (quoting jurors’ affidavits) (internal citations omitted).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 869.
138. Id.
139. See supra Part II.
140. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863–67; see supra Part III.
141. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863–65.
142. See id. at 886 (providing an appendix listing cases in which the respective states
have judicially recognized a racial-bias exception).
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when racial bias is used to reach a verdict.144 Finally, the Court addressed
the concerns expressed in Tanner v. United States and Warger v.
Shauers.145
Having recited the evolution of the no-impeachment rule, Justice
Kennedy proceeded to the heart of the Court’s reasoning: given our nation’s
struggle with extinguishing racism from the justice system, “[t]ime and
again, this Court has been called upon to enforce the Constitution’s
guarantee against state-sponsored racial discrimination in the jury
system.”146 The Court cited many cases wherein it sought to expunge racial
discrimination from the justice system and noted that allowing racial bias in
the jury rooms is “‘especially pernicious.’”147 Moreover, Justice Kennedy
distinguished racial bias from the juror misconduct in other cases involving
the no-impeachment rule. 148 Thus, because “racial bias implicates unique
historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns,” it is “a familiar and
recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the
administration of justice.”149
In articulating this new rule, the Court explained that purging juries of
racial bias is more “necessary to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in
jury verdicts” than any damage to the jury and verdict safeguards laid out in
Tanner.150 But fleeting or inconsequential remarks on race do not fit this
new exception because the Court narrowed its holding to evidence of overt
racial bias or discrimination.151 Consequently, “[t]o qualify, the statement
must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in
the juror’s vote to convict.”152 Beyond that directive, however, the Court
did not provide a framework or test to help lower courts determine when a

143. See id. at 865 (citing United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87–88 (1st Cir. 2009);
United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1119–21 (9th Cir. 2001); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827
F.2d 1155, 1158–60 (7th Cir. 1987)).
144. Id. Later in the opinion, however, Justice Kennedy stated that 17 jurisdictions had a
racial-bias exception prior to Peña-Rodriguez. Id. at 870.
145. See supra Part III.
146. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867.
147. Id. at 868 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
148. Id. (“Racial bias of the kind alleged in this case differs in critical ways from the
compromise verdict in McDonald, the drug and alcohol abuse in Tanner, or the prodefendant bias in Warger.”).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 869.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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juror’s racially charged statements require admission of juror testimony
about those statements.153
Finally, the Supreme Court recognized that Juror H.C.’s statements,
which “were egregious and unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias,” fit
this new exception.154 Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the
case.155
D. Justice Alito’s Dissent
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas,156 Justice Alito
attacked the majority’s holding on four grounds: (1) the extensive history of
no-impeachment rule; (2) the safeguards elucidated in Tanner that are in
place throughout a trial; (3) the lack of a hierarchy of fairness or
impartiality under the Sixth Amendment; and (4) the majority’s willingness
to undermine the underlying public policy concerns the no-impeachment
rule was designed to protect.157
Justice Alito began his dissent by recounting the exhaustive history of
the no-impeachment rule158 before reiterating the holdings of Tanner and
Warger.159 In particular, Justice Alito focused on the “crucial interests”
advanced by the no-impeachment rule and the trial safeguards that the
Tanner Court identified as protecting criminal defendants’ Sixth
Amendment right against juror misconduct.160 In its opinion, the majority
addressed two of these safeguards—voir dire and pre-verdict juror
reports—and found them ineffective against the type of racial bias the
holding attempts to eliminate.161 Justice Alito disagreed and argued that the

153. See id.
154. Id. at 870.
155. Id. at 871.
156. In addition, Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opinion. See id. at 871–74
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 875–85 (Alito, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 875–78 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also discussion supra Part II.
159. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 878–82 (Alito, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 879–80 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127
(1987) (“Petitioners’ Sixth Amendment interests in an unimpaired jury, on the other hand,
are protected by several aspects of the trial process. The suitability of an individual for the
responsibility of jury service, of course, is examined during voir dire. Moreover, during the
trial the jury is observable by the court, by counsel, and by court personnel. Moreover, jurors
are observable by each other, and may report inappropriate juror behavior to the
court before they render a verdict. Finally, after the trial a party may seek to impeach the
verdict by nonjuror evidence of misconduct.”) (internal citations omitted).
161. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 880 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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majority “provide[d] no good reason to depart from the calculus made in
Tanner and Warger.”162
Next, Justice Alito contested the majority’s argument that racial bias
presents a unique challenge to the justice system and is thus worthy of its
own exception to FRE 606(b).163 While Justice Alito agreed with the
majority on the pernicious nature of racial discrimination, he emphasized
the language of the Sixth Amendment and its corresponding
jurisprudence.164 Specifically, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to
an impartial jury but does not indicate a hierarchy of impartiality.165
Moreover, Justice Alito warned that the majority’s rationale would likely
open the door to other types of discriminations being recognized. But how
future courts will categorize such impartialities and whether the Sixth
Amendment offers protection in such cases remains unclear.166
Finally, the dissent pointed out that the majority’s holding would
exacerbate public policy concerns surrounding juror testimony—namely,
juror harassment and the finality of verdicts.167 By allowing post-verdict
scrutiny into jury deliberations, Justice Alito warned of “an increase in
harassment, arm-twisting, and outright coercion” of jurors,168 which may
“undermine the finality of verdicts.”169 These public policy concerns played
a major role in the development of the no-impeachment rule, and Justice
Alito argued that the majority’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado
would bring those harms to the forefront.170
V. The Effect of Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado
Given the long, seemingly settled history of the no-impeachment rule,
the Supreme Court’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado has profound
ramifications both now and in the course of time. Accordingly, Part V first
examines the immediate impact of Peña-Rodriguez, including its effect on
162. Id. at 882 (Alito, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 882–84 (Alito, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 882 (Alito, J., dissenting).
165. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the text or history of the Amendment or in
the inherent nature of the jury trial right suggests that the extent of the protection provided
by the Amendment depends on the nature of a jury's partiality or bias.”).
166. Id. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 884–85 (Alito, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 885 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267
(1915)).
169. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the no-impeachment rule, and addresses some unanswered issues that courts
must navigate moving forward. Next, Part V explains the reason for an
early consensus that Peña-Rodriguez will be expanded—potentially to civil
cases and eventually to other forms of bias and discrimination.
A. Immediate Impact: FRE 606(b) Is Now Facially Incomplete
Peña-Rodriguez holds that the no-impeachment rule must yield to a
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights when jurors use explicit
racial bias to reach a verdict.171 In effect, the Supreme Court created an
additional exception to the no-impeachment rule that renders FRE 606(b)
incomplete and unconstitutional for such cases. Moreover, because the
Court’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez is based on the Sixth Amendment—
which is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment 172—this
newly created exception affects state trials in addition to federal trials,
implicating each state’s no-impeachment rule. As a result, Oklahoma’s
Rule 2606(B) is similarly incomplete.
In addition to the partial invalidation of FRE 606(b) and comparable
state rules, the Peña-Rodriguez holding creates uncertainty about when
racial bias or animus crosses the threshold and becomes subject to
testimony by other jurors.173 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion did not
provide a clear-cut rule or framework to address future challenges174—
much like Justice Scalia’s decision not to define “testimonial” in the

171. See id. at 869–70.
172. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (“The deep commitment of the
Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law
enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States.”).
173. This uncertainty exists because “[n]ot every offhand comment indicating racial bias
or hostility will justify setting aside the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial
inquiry.” Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. Therefore, “there must be a showing that one or
more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the
fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting verdict.” Id. But “[w]hether
that threshold showing has been satisfied is a matter committed to the substantial discretion
of the trial court.” Id.
174. See id. at 869–70; see also Jason Koffler, Note, Laboratories of Equal Justice: What
State Experience Portends for Expansion of the Peña-Rodriguez Exception Beyond Race,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1801, 1823 (2018) (“Pena-Rodriguez, groundbreaking as it may have
been, was a relatively barebones decision that avoided meaningful engagement with the
many procedural and doctrinal issues created by subjecting the no-impeachment rule to a
constitutional racial-bias exception in criminal cases.”).
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seminal Sixth Amendment case Crawford v. Washington.175 Nevertheless,
Justice Kennedy did provide a starting point by requiring “a showing that
one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast
serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury's deliberations and
resulting verdict.”176 But determining whether a juror’s racial bias or
animus crosses this threshold or is a significant enough factor in reaching
the verdict will be left to the trial court’s discretion.177
Rather than elucidating a bright-line rule, the Supreme Court will rely on
the seventeen jurisdictions that already have judicially created racial-bias
exceptions to their FRE 606(b) counterparts.178 But, as Justice Kennedy
briefly noted, “there is a diversity of approaches” among those
jurisdictions.179 For example, not every state with a judicially recognized
racial-bias exception based its exception on constitutional principles.180 Of
those states that did, some states relied upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses to establish their exceptions.181
Meanwhile, Peña-Rodriguez was based on the Sixth Amendment and
accordingly applies to all states. Therefore, states with racial-bias
exceptions that were based on other constitutional principles may not
provide much help to other states because Peña-Rodriguez has now
subsumed and superseded that case law. Because Justice Kennedy entrusted
states to develop their own procedures and standards when applying PeñaRodriguez182 and because the federal rule has not been amended, it is
175. Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–53, 68 (2004) (“We leave for
another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”), with PeñaRodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870 (“The Court also does not decide the appropriate standard for
determining when evidence of racial bias is sufficient to require that the verdict be set aside
and a new trial be granted.”).
176. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
177. See id. In fact, the trial court will have “substantial discretion . . . in light of all
circumstances, including the content and timing of the alleged statements and the reliability
of the proffered evidence.” Id. (emphasis added).
178. See id. at 870 (“[T]he Court relies on the experiences of the 17 jurisdictions that
have recognized a racial-bias exception to the no-impeachment rule—some for over half a
century—with no signs of an increase in juror harassment or a loss of juror willingness to
engage in searching and candid deliberations. The experience of these jurisdictions, and the
experience of the courts going forward, will inform the proper exercise of trial judge
discretion in these and related matters.”); see also id. at 886 (providing an appended list of
jurisdictions that have a judicially recognized racial bias exception).
179. Id. at 865.
180. See Koffler, supra note 174, at 1828–30.
181. Id. at 1829.
182. See supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text.
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unclear how each state will approach such a precedent-setting decision,
leaving lawyers in the dark.183
Oklahoma, in particular, faces a potentially steep learning curve. Like
FRE 606(b), Oklahoma’s Rule 2606(B) is silent concerning a juror’s use of
racial bias or animus in the jury room,184 and Oklahoma has no prior
jurisprudence to consult.185 As a result, the absence of a racial-bias
exception in the evidence rules has set a trap for unwary attorneys. As the
introductory hypothetical illustrates, perpetuating an incomplete and
unconstitutional evidence rule threatens the administration of justice by
unnecessarily and indirectly obscuring a prominent addition to evidence
law. Apart from criminal defendants, public defenders are most affected by
this change. They are also typically in the best position to learn of alleged
juror misconduct. For example, in two of the three Supreme Court cases
interpreting the no-impeachment rule, jurors approached the defense
counsel with testimony of another juror’s misconduct.186 In the third case—
a civil suit—the juror approached the plaintiff’s counsel shortly after his
client lost.187 Unfortunately, however, public defenders are notoriously
overworked and underpaid188 and, as a result, may be susceptible to errors

183. See Lauren Crump, Comment, Removing Race from the Jury Deliberation Room:
The Shortcomings of Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado and How to Address Them, 52 U. RICH. L.
REV. 475, 492–93 (2018) (“Allowing trial courts to make case-by-case determinations as to
whether racial bias occurred will lead to wide-spread disparities in the application of the noimpeachment rule exception, and instances of racial bias will inevitably creep into jury
verdicts.”).
184. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2606(B) (2011).
185. Contra Washington v. Berhe, 444 P.3d 1172, 1179 (Wash. 2019) (“By the time
Peña-Rodriguez was decided, Washington had already begun to develop procedures for
addressing motions for a new trial based on allegations of racial bias of a juror.”) (citing
Washington v. Jackson, 879 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1994)).
186. See supra Section III.A and Part IV.
187. See supra Section III.B.
188. See, e.g., Heather Perry Baxter, At a Crossroads: Where the Indigent Defense Crisis
and the Legal Education Crisis Intersect, 18 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 25, 29
(2016) (discussing a then-recent study that found public defenders in Missouri spent an
“alarmingly small amount of time . . . on each case”); Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 15, 19 (2016) (“[S]ome states appear worse than others, but public
defenders nationwide are underfunded and overworked.”); see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr. &
Jugal K. Patel, One Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and No Time, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public-defender-case-loads.html; Alexa
Van Brunt, Poor People Rely on Public Defenders Who Are Too Overworked to Defend
Them, GUARDIAN (June 17, 2015, 7:30 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2015/jun/17/poor-rely-public-defenders-too-overworked.
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and oversights. Therefore, until evidence codes are revised to reflect this
recent change in law, the administration of justice may be unnecessarily
hindered by incomplete no-impeachment rules in Oklahoma and
nationwide.
B. Future Impact: Peña-Rodriguez May Have Opened Pandora’s Box
Evaluating the longer-term effects of the Peña-Rodriguez decision also
presents a formidable challenge. Because the Supreme Court issued a
significant ruling without offering much guidance concerning its
application,189 early scholarship has sought to fill in the gaps. The
prevailing consensus maintains that the holding in Peña-Rodriguez will
likely be expanded in two ways: the racial-bias exception will apply to civil
cases and will eventually incorporate additional forms of discrimination.190
Even the Advisory Committee has recognized that attorneys will argue to
expand the Peña-Rodriguez holding because “[t]he scope of the
constitutional right remains to be developed.”191 Whether courts ultimately
expand Peña-Rodriguez remains to be seen, but attorneys have already
sought Supreme Court review to advocate for Peña-Rodriguez’s application
to other forms of discrimination—specifically, juror bias based on the
defendant’s sexual orientation.192 Though threats of expansion may seem
distant, they are looming.
Here in Oklahoma, public defenders also face similar issues with understaffed, underfunded,
and overworked public defenders’ offices. See, e.g., Josh Dulaney, Biding Time: “Do the
Most with the Least”, OKLAHOMAN (June 28, 2017), https://newsok.com/special/
article/5553775.
189. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
190. See generally, e.g., Jarod S. Gonzalez, The New Batson: Opening the Door of the
Jury Deliberation Room After Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 397, 409
(2018) (“The Supreme Court opened the door and created the exception” in criminal cases,
but the policy reasons the Court provided “fit just as well with the administration of justice
by civil juries as they do with the administration of justice by criminal juries.”); Koffler,
supra note 174; see also Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 884 (2017) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“Today's decision—especially if it is expanded in the ways that seem likely—
will invite the harms that no-impeachment rules were designed to prevent.”) (emphasis
added).
191. Adv. Comm. on Rules of Evidence, Report to Standing Committee (May 7, 2017)
[hereinafter Report to Standing Committee], in Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure,
June 2017 Meeting Materials 735, 742 (June 12, 2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/|
default/files/2017-06-standing-agenda_book_0.pdf.
192. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rhines v. South Dakota, 138 S. Ct. 2660 (2018)
(No. 17-8791) (arguing defendant was subject to discrimination, within the jury room, based
on his homosexuality); see also Jordan S. Rubin, Gay Death Row Inmate Wants SCOTUS
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The first step toward expanding the Peña-Rodriguez holding will likely
result from the application of its analysis to civil cases. Because the
Supreme Court based its holding on the Sixth Amendment and a criminal
defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial,193 Peña-Rodriguez is currently
inapplicable in civil cases where jurors express racial bias in reaching their
verdict.194 Anticipating the expansion to civil cases is quite reasonable,
however, given its striking resemblance to Batson v. Kentucky and its
progeny of cases.195
In Batson, the Supreme Court held that race-based discrimination in the
form of peremptory challenges during voir dire of a criminal case is
unconstitutional.196 Like Peña-Rodriguez, Batson carved out a narrow
exception to a broad right—the right to exclude a potential juror using a
peremptory challenge—and only applied to criminal cases and racial
discrimination.197 But five years later, the Court expanded Batson to apply
in civil cases as well.198 The main difference between Batson and PeñaRodriguez, however, is that the former was grounded in the Equal
Protection Clause, while the latter relied on the Sixth Amendment.199 Some
scholars posit that the underlying theme in both cases is an equal protection
issue,200 but the Court chose a more measured approach by basing PeñaReview of Jury Bias Claim, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 12, 2018, 2:08 PM), https://news.
bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminal-law/gay-death-row-inmate-wants-scotusreview-of-jury-bias-claim (via subscription).
193. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (“[T]he Court now holds that where a juror
makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to
convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule
give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror's statement
and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.”).
194. See id.
195. See generally Gonzalez, supra note 190.
196. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
197. Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 404.
198. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616–17 (1991); see Gonzalez,
supra note 190, at 404, 408.
199. Compare Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (“Accordingly, the component of the jury selection
process at issue here, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory
challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause.”), with PeñaRodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (“[W]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or
she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth
Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court
to consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial
guarantee.”); see Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 404.
200. See Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 405 (“The heart of both the Peña-Rodriguez and
Batson decisions is really an equal protection concern, although Peña-Rodriguez is framed
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Rodriguez on the Sixth Amendment because of the susceptibility for
expansion if framed using the Equal Protection Clause.201 In fact, in Justice
Alito’s dissent, he postulates that Peña-Rodriguez is actually an equal
protection case instead of a Sixth Amendment case,202 making the
majority’s holding more susceptible to expansion.203 Therefore, in order to
convince courts that Peña-Rodriguez should apply to civil cases, attorneys
must argue that Peña-Rodriguez is actually an Equal Protection Clause case
cloaked in Sixth Amendment robes.204 If subsequent courts agree, then the
trajectory of Peña-Rodriguez will likely resemble that of Batson.
The second step in Peña-Rodriguez’s evolutionary trajectory may require
the no-impeachment rule to yield to the Sixth Amendment in order to allow
jurors to testify about other forms of bias or discrimination made in the jury
room. In other words, the racial-bias exception will become a broader “bias
exception.” Most notably, Justice Alito warned of this possibility in his
dissent.205 Justice Alito worried that Peña-Rodriguez might be an equal
protection case masquerading as a Sixth Amendment case,206 and, if courts
in the context of the Sixth Amendment . . . .”); Richard Lorren Jolly, The New Impartial Jury
Mandate, 117 MICH. L. REV. 713, 751 (2019) (“Nevertheless, as Justice Alito’s dissent
highlights, the holding seems to sound more in concepts drawn from the Fourteenth
Amendment than it does in the Sixth Amendment.”); see also Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at
868 (stating that the holding is not an attempt to create a perfect jury but is rather an attempt
at “coming ever closer to the promise of equal treatment under the law that is so central to a
functioning democracy”) (emphasis added).
201. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Recasting this
[decision] as an equal protection case would not provide a ground for limiting the holding to
cases involving racial bias.”); Robert I. Correales, Is Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado Just a
Drop in the Bucket or a Catalyst for Improving a Jury System Still Plagued by Racial Bias,
and Still Badly in Need of Repairs?, 21 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 1, 11 (2018) (“Time will tell
whether the Court's reluctance to fully deploy Equal Protection was an oversight or perhaps
an intentional and strategic move to lay the first stone in the foundation of a more expansive
doctrine.”).
202. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Today's decision—especially if it is
expanded in the ways that seem likely—will invite the harms that no-impeachment rules
were designed to prevent.”) (emphasis added).
204. Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 408 (“[T]he winning argument for extending PeñaRodriguez to civil cases brought in federal district court is equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment. This argument merely takes a page right out of the Batson and Edmonson
playbook.”). Moreover, if Peña-Rodriguez were recast as an equal protection issue, it would
also be based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to apply
to the states.
205. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 196–201.
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agree with him, then “[a]t a minimum, cases involving bias based on any
suspect classification—such as national origin or religion—would merit
equal treatment.”207 Justice Alito also agreed that bias based on gender or
the exercise of First Amendment-protected activity would also garner
similar protections.208 If the racial-bias exception is expanded, courts will
likely look to equal protection jurisprudence to determine which suspect
classifications should be protected. But, at this point, it is unclear where
courts will draw the line among different forms of bias. According to
Justice Alito, if Peña-Rodriguez is eventually framed as an equal protection
concern, “convicting a defendant on the basis of any irrational classification
would violate the Equal Protection Clause.”209
Academic scholarship on this issue also tends to support Justice Alito’s
contention that Peña-Rodriguez is primed to expand and incorporate other
forms of bias or discrimination.210 Maybe more importantly, the Advisory
Committee also believes that Peña-Rodriguez will be expanded or that, at
the very least, defense attorneys will vigorously advocate for its
expansion.211 This uncertainty—if, when, and to what extent PeñaRodriguez will be expanded—has complicated the remedial responses by

207. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883 (Alito, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 884 (Alito, J., dissenting).
210. See supra note 203 and accompanying text; Jolly, supra note 200, at 750 (“While
the majority in Peña-Rodriguez is adamant that the decision is limited to racial biases in
criminal cases, it is unlikely that the Court can identify a limiting principle to exclude
testimony of bias against additional suspected classes . . . .”); Correales, supra note 201, at
11 (“Time will tell whether the Court's reluctance to fully deploy Equal Protection was an
oversight or perhaps an intentional and strategic move to lay the first stone in the foundation
of a more expansive doctrine.”); Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 405 (“The United States
Supreme Court cracked open the door of the jury deliberation room as a matter of
Constitutional law in Peña-Rodriguez. Now that the door is open a little bit, it is not going to
be shut.”); Koffler, supra note 174, at 1855–56 (“Both state experience with bias exceptions
to the no-impeachment rule and the Court's own experience with Batson and related cases
suggest expansion is coming. Significant pragmatic and normative reasons support such
expansion.”).
211. See Adv. Comm. on Rules of Evidence, Spring 2017 Meeting Materials 279 (Apr.
21,
2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/advisory_committee_on_rules_
of_evidence_-_spring_2017_meeting_materials.pdf [hereinafter Adv. Comm. Spring 2017
Meeting] (“[T]here is a possibility that the constitutional right found in Peña-Rodriguez
could be extended[—]for example, to statements that indicate a sexual bias, or a religious
bias, or a bias against old people, or a failure to respect the defendant’s right not to testify,”
and “[t]here is also a pretty fair possibility that the holding in Peña-Rodriguez could be
extended to civil cases.”).
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the Advisory Committee and state legislatures.212 As a result, only Virginia
has updated their respective evidence rule,213 while the remaining
jurisdictions are taking a wait-and-see approach.
Another interesting wrinkle that compounds the uncertainty of the PeñaRodriguez decision is the recently changed makeup of the Supreme Court.
Peña-Rodriguez was decided by a vote of 5-3 while Justice Scalia’s seat
remained vacant following his death.214 Since then, Justice Gorsuch has
been confirmed to the Supreme Court,215 and Justice Kennedy—the author
of Peña-Rodriguez—has been replaced by Justice Kavanaugh.216 As a
result, the Supreme Court has shifted, in theory, toward a conservative
majority for the foreseeable future.217 How the new Supreme Court will
approach juror misconduct cases is speculative, for now, but could play a
major role in deciding whether Peña-Rodriguez will or should be expanded.
VI. How Lawmakers Can Rectify This Discrepancy
Despite the rule-altering holding in Peña-Rodriguez, FRE 606(b) is
unchanged. The Advisory Committee has discussed amending FRE 606(b)
but has yet to act,218 and only one state has updated its evidence code in
212. See discussion infra Sections V.B, VI.A–C.
213. VA. R. EVID. 2:606(b)(ii)(d). Of course, as Justice Kennedy points out in the
majority opinion, seventeen jurisdictions already have judicially recognized racial-bias
exceptions, though none has explicated an exception in its evidence codes. See PeñaRodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870; see also id. at 886 (providing an appendix listing the
jurisdictions with a judicially recognized exception for evidence of racial bias).
214. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 860. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in the majority, while Justices Alito, Roberts, and
Thomas dissented. Id.
215. See Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as
Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/
us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html.
216. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn In After Close Confirmation Vote in
Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brettkavanaugh-supreme-court.html.
217. See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Conservatives Now in Charge, the Supreme
Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/
06/28/us/politics/supreme-court-2017-term-moved-right.html.
218. See Adv. Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting, supra note 211, at 276–83; Adv. Comm. on
Rules of Evidence, Fall 2017 Meeting Materials 27–28 (Oct. 26–27, 2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/a3_0.pdf; Adv. Comm. on Rules of Evidence,
Spring 2018 Meeting Materials 17–18 (Apr. 26–27, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/agenda_book_advisory_committee_on_rules_of_evidence_-_final.pdf;
Adv. Comm. on Rules of Evidence, Fall 2018 Meeting Materials 3–5 (Oct. 19, 2018),
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response to Peña-Rodriguez.219 But why? As Part V illustrated, the
expansion of the racial-bias exception is peering over the crest of the
horizon, awaiting its inevitability. Meanwhile, the Advisory Committee and
state legislators are playing a waiting game to see how the jurisdictional
case law will develop.220
At the first Advisory Committee meeting following the Peña-Rodriguez
decision, the Committee acknowledged that “Rule 606(b) is
unconstitutional as applied at least to racist statements made by jurors while
deliberating in criminal cases.”221 In response, the Advisory Committee
considered three proposed amendments, in addition to standing pat. The
first proposal recommended a straight-forward exception, mirroring the
holding in Peña-Rodriguez.222 The second proposal expanded the exception
to include other forms of discrimination, in anticipation of the expansion of
Peña-Rodriguez.223 The third proposal included a generic constitutional
safeguard designed to capture any new exceptions recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court.224 Ultimately, however, the Advisory Committee took a
wait-and-see approach, leaving FRE 606(b) incomplete and failing to
provide states with any guidance on updating their respective rules.225
Each proposed amendment has its benefits and downsides. The following
sections introduce similar alternatives to update Oklahoma’s Rule 2606(B)
and explain why playing the waiting game is a losing effort. The first
alternative narrowly adopts the holding of Peña-Rodriguez, and the second
alternative incorporates a more generous exception that has room to grow
with subsequent case law. Though Oklahoma has mostly been lethargic

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-10-evidence-agenda-book_0.pdf
[hereinafter Adv. Comm. Fall 2018 Meeting]. Discussion of Peña-Rodriguez and possible
amendments to FRE 606(b) was not on the agenda for the Advisory Committee’s most
recent meeting.
219. See VA. R. EVID. 2:606(b)(ii)(d).
220. In fairness, Justice Kennedy also took this approach in Peña-Rodriguez. See 137 S.
Ct. 855, 870 (2017) (“The experiences of these jurisdictions [that recognize a racial-bias
exception], and the experience of the courts going forward, will inform the proper exercise
of trial judge discretion in these and related matters.”).
221. Report to Standing Committee, supra note 191, at 742.
222. See Adv. Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting, supra note 211, at 278–80.
223. Id. at 280–81.
224. Id. at 281–83.
225. See Adv. Comm. Fall 2018 Meeting, supra note 218, at 47 (“The Chair wrapped up
the discussion by noting that the issue would be tabled for one to two years to allow more
time for case law to develop before the Committee reconsidered action on Rule 606(b).”).
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toward amending its evidence code following federal rule changes,226 the
Sooner State can provide clarity and completeness to its no-impeachment
rule—all while encouraging other jurisdictions to amend their own noimpeachment rules.
A. Why Action Is Needed
Each attorney is obligated to render effective counsel for his client
through diligent and competent representation.227 Accordingly, any attorney
faced with a situation similar to the one in Peña-Rodriguez should be aware
of the Supreme Court’s holding and should, thus, be able to render effective
counsel. Moreover, it is worth noting that in the age of Westlaw, even
cursory legal research should uncover an on-point U.S. Supreme Court case

226. Within the last thirty years, two federal rules—FRE 803(10) and 412—were
affected by Supreme Court holdings and were subsequently amended by the Advisory
Committee to ensure compliance with constitutional rights. In each case, the Advisory
Committee took a different approach.
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court stated that FRE 803(10) searches
can be testimonial and, thus, subject to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See
557 U.S. 305, 323 (2009). But the Supreme Court endorsed notice-and-demand statutes as a
method of satisfying a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights. See id. at 325–28.
Accordingly, the Advisory Committee included a narrow exception to FRE 803(10) that
encapsulates the notice-and-demand statutes contemplated by the Supreme Court in
Melendez-Diaz. FED. R. EVID. 803(10)(B); see id. 803(10)(B) advisory committee’s note to
2013 amendment (“Rule 803(10) has been amended in response to Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.”).
In Olden v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court identified a situation in which a criminal
defendant’s confrontation rights were violated when he was prohibited from discussing a key
fact in a rape case because FRE 412 prevented inquiries into a victim’s sexual predisposition
and prior sexual behavior. 488 U.S. 227, 231–32 (1988) (per curiam). As a result, the
Advisory Committee instituted a broad constitutional safeguard in FRE 412 to ameliorate
Olden-like situations in the future. FED. R. EVID. 412; see id. 412 advisory committee’s note
to 1994 amendment.
These two rule modifications are indicative of the probable future amendment to FRE
606(b) and knowing how Oklahoma has responded to previous federal evidence rule changes
can help assist lawmakers in amending Rule 2606(B). Unfortunately, however, Oklahoma
has not amended either evidence rule, further justifying the need to update the state’s
evidence code in addition to Rule 2606(B). Though, it should be noted that Oklahoma
accounts for a notice-and-demand requirement, similar to the one in FRE 803(10)(B),
elsewhere in its statutes. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 751 (Supp. 2013); see also Randolph v. State,
2010 OK CR 2, ¶ 3, 231 P.3d 672, 684 (Lumpkin, J., specially concurring) (“[A]t least
implicitly, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that the type of notice/demand procedure set
out in 22 O.S.Supp.2004, § 751(A)(3) meets constitutional muster, even in a trial setting.”).
227. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.1, 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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such as Peña-Rodriguez. So, practically speaking, judges and litigators have
the tools necessary to navigate a Peña-Rodriguez-like situation.
Nevertheless, the main reason for codifying the Federal Rules of
Evidence was to promote accessibility.228 In theory, “[t]he Rules can be
printed in a small book easily carried to court, quickly perused and readily
understandable.”229 But Rule 2606(B) and its federal counterpart are now
incomplete, and maintaining an incomplete rule perpetuates an
unconstitutional trap for the unwary—especially for Oklahoma’s
overworked and underpaid public defenders.230 This risk alone should
warrant correction.231
Prior to the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence, judges and
practitioners also had the necessary tools at their disposal—albeit, sprinkled
among thousands of cases over a century of jurisprudence. However, the
Supreme Court and lawmakers recognized the need for a uniform and
universal set of evidence rules and, accordingly, codified and published the
federal evidence code. Those same policy concerns that motivated the
codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence—namely, fairness and
accuracy—still exist today, beckoning for resolution.
B. First Alternative: Codifying Peña-Rodriguez
One simple way to produce constitutionally fair verdicts is to amend
Rule 2606(B), according to the holding in Peña-Rodriguez. In effect, the
racial-bias exception would update the rule to conform to the current noimpeachment rule jurisprudence and provide clarity to parties. Because
Oklahoma did not follow the Advisory Committee in restyling the evidence
rules into a bullet-point format, the racial-bias exception should be added as

228. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK & LIESA L. RICHTER, EVIDENCE
UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 2 (9th ed. 2019).
229. Id.
230. See sources cited supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
231. Though, it should be noted that an amendment may not be required since PenaRodriguez invoked the Sixth Amendment and now applies to all criminal trials. See Adv.
Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting, supra note 211, at 277 (“It surely can be argued that no
amendment to Rule 606(b) is necessary in response to Pena-Rodriguez. No amendment is
needed to remove the Rule 606(b) bar on testimony about racist statements during
deliberation. The Sixth Amendment has already removed that bar.”). That being said, the
perpetuation of an incomplete evidence rule, which may produce potentially unconstitutional
results, impedes the administration of justice. See supra text accompanying notes 181–84.
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Section C to Rule 2606.232 Under this alternative, the exception should read
as follows:
C. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may testify about whether one or more jurors made a clear
statement indicating that the juror or jurors relied on racial
stereotypes or animus to convict a defendant in a criminal
case.233
The benefit of this proposal is clear: Rule 2606 would render a complete
picture of the no-impeachment rule and would resolve any unconstitutional
misapplications of the rule as currently written.234 This alternative may be
an attractive option, especially for more conservative states like Oklahoma,
because the amended verbiage aligns the rule with current law without
expanding the exception or anticipating what the law might become. On the
other hand, the drawback to this proposal is that the holding of PeñaRodriguez is prone to expansion and may soon encapsulate other forms of
discrimination.235 Therefore, amending the rule now may prove futile if the
law changes in a few years. But, because that rationale perpetuates a state
of uncertainty and deficiency, change remains necessary.
For Oklahoma, the advantages of this alternative outweigh its
disadvantages. Rule 2606 could develop alongside Supreme Court
precedent while diligently maintaining Oklahoma’s evidence code.
Furthermore, Rule 2606 would preserve the interpretation advanced by the
Supreme Court without unintentionally incorporating future developments.
In essence, by adopting this alternative, Oklahoma would accomplish only
what is needed and nothing more.

232. Whereas, an amendment to FRE 606(b) would likely be added as a fourth
exception—subsection (D)—to FRE 606(b)(2). See Adv. Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting,
supra note 211, at 278; cf. id. at 283 (creating a slightly different composition of the FRE
606(b) exceptions when creating a general constitutional protection exception).
233. This proposed amendment aligns with the current, non-bullet-point format of Rule
2606 by adding a section (C) that mirrors the holding in Peña-Rodriguez. See PeñaRodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017); cf. Adv. Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting,
supra note 211, at 278 (adding the new racial-bias exception according to FRE 606(b)’s
format).
234. The ambiguity in applying the racial-bias exception, however, still remains due to
the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and the significant discretion imposed on trial
courts. See supra text accompanying notes 171–80.
235. See sources cited supra notes 206–07.
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C. Second Alternative: Expanding Beyond Peña-Rodriguez
When contemplating how to modify FRE 606(b) and comparable state
statutes, the prevailing refrain among prognosticators is that PeñaRodriguez is primed for expansion.236 In other words, Peña-Rodriguez is
really an equal protection case,237 and, given time, courts will expand the
rule to civil cases and other forms of discrimination or bias. In recognition
of this potential for expansion, states may favor adopting exceptions with
room to grow—thereby eliminating the need to amend their noimpeachment rules should the Supreme Court later expand Peña-Rodriguez.
However, lawmakers who choose this path must confront a crucial question
in the to-expand-or-not-to-expand debate: where should the line be drawn?
At one end of the exception spectrum exists a simple racial-bias
exception, similar to the one discussed in the preceding section. At the other
end of that spectrum is the Iowa rule. At its initial, post-Peña-Rodriguez
meeting, the Advisory Committee considered two proposals aimed at
creating a broad exception to FRE 606(b); however, despite several
suggested amendments, the Committee only produced one fully formed
amendment—a generic constitutional safeguard.238 Modified to conform
with Oklahoma’s current Rule 2606 format, Section (C) would read:
C. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may testify if excluding that juror’s testimony would
violate a party’s constitutional rights.239
This alternative would ensure compliance with constitutional rights and
obviate the need for further amendments.240 Additionally, this new
236. See sources cited supra notes 206–07.
237. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 883 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“Recasting this as an equal protection case would not provide a ground for limiting the
holding to cases involving racial bias.”); Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 405 (“The heart of
both Peña-Rodriguez and Batson decisions is really an equal protection concern, although
Peña-Rodriguez is framed in the context of the Sixth Amendment . . . .”); Leading Cases,
Sixth Amendment—No-Impeachment Rule—Racially Biased Statements in Jury
Deliberations—Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 131 HARV. L. REV. 273, 279 (2017) (“Rather
than limiting himself to the discrete body of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice
Kennedy viewed Peña-Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment claim as opening up the full panoply
of constitutional values, engendering an analysis replete with equal protection references.”).
238. See Adv. Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting, supra note 211, at 278–83 (providing four
possible amendments but not providing explicit examples of how the third proposal would
be codified).
239. See id. at 283.
240. See id.
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exception would function as a “heads up” of additional constitutional
protections for unwary practitioners. On the other hand, some may interpret
such an exception as greatly expanding the rule created in Peña-Rodriguez,
leaving the rule at the mercy of the ever-developing area of constitutional
law. Because some areas of constitutional law, especially those involving
individual rights, remain nebulous until the Supreme Court weighs in,
circuit courts split and develop their own case law.241 The Advisory
Committee worried about such ramifications and discussed adding a
qualifier to “a party’s constitutional rights.”242 Under this derivative
version, a juror may testify when “excluding the testimony would violate
clearly established constitutional law as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States.”243 After some discussion, the Advisory Committee
ultimately rejected this idea because it would handicap lower courts in their
legitimate, independent efforts to discern constitutional imperatives.244
Though the Committee decided that the generic constitutional exception is
the better alternative, it has yet to modify FRE 606(b)—thus prolonging the
waiting game.245
For Oklahoma, this option may go a step too far; a more measured
amendment is likely more palatable given the state’s generally conservative
approach to rulemaking. That being said, at the heart of Peña-Rodriguez
lies the primary aim of ensuring that criminal defendants receive their
constitutionally mandated right to a fair trial. Though the Supreme Court
couched its holding in narrow terms to address the unique and pernicious
nature of racism in the justice system, reason suggests that other forms of
bias and animus also might infringe upon one’s Sixth Amendment right.
241. Recently, for example, the Supreme Court was expected to provide a resolution on
the intersectional conflict of religious freedoms and LGBT rights in the case Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. See, e.g., Klint W. Alexander, The
Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision and the Clash Between Nondiscrimination and Religious
Freedom, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 1069, 1069–70 (2019) (“The expectation among legal scholars
was that this case would provide important guidance concerning the uneven recognition of
LGBT rights under federal and state antidiscrimination laws and the role of religious liberty
and free expression in this calculus.”). Somewhat unexpectedly, however, the Court decided
the case on very narrow procedural grounds. See id. at 1101–02; see also Leslie Kendrick &
Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 133 (2018) (“Rather
than sorting out the principles for determining whether religious liberty authorizes
discrimination against gays and lesbians in the marketplace, the Court focused on whether
state officials treated religious objections with the proper respect and consideration.”).
242. See Adv. Comm. Fall 2018 Meeting, supra note 218, at 45–46.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 46.
245. Id. at 47.
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Recognizing this reality and aspiring to rectify such injustice is a worthy
objective. But is a state like Oklahoma ready to take a leap when it
normally takes a step?246
D. Oklahoma Should Lead the Way by Creating a Constitutional Exception
to Its Evidence Rule 2606
Along with a majority of states without racial-bias exceptions, Oklahoma
finds itself in a precarious position. The first question Oklahoma lawmakers
must answer is whether to amend its evidence rule now or wait for case law
to develop—or, even, whether to wait for the Advisory Committee to create
the exemplar for states to adopt? The answer to that question should,
instinctively, be a “yes” to updating Rule 2606 to align with the Supreme
Court’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez. As Section V.A addressed,
perpetuating an outdated evidence rule obscures the truth and hinders the
administration of justice in cases involving overt racial bias in the jury
room. A simple amendment to Oklahoma’s Rule 2606 that incorporates the
Peña-Rodriguez holding would fix the current discrepancy and put criminal
defense lawyers on notice of additional constitutional protections.
But, as Section V.B emphasized, Peña-Rodriguez is primed for
expansion. How, when, and to what extent will its holding be expanded are
questions best left for another day, but most scholars forecast that PeñaRodriguez will be expanded to include other suspect classifications of
discrimination and will eventually be applied in civil cases. Therefore, the
second question Oklahoma lawmakers must answer is whether to create a
narrow racial-bias exception or to amend the rule, with room to grow, by
including a broad constitutional safeguard.
Answering the second question is undoubtedly the harder task.
Proponents of the Peña-Rodriguez decision applaud the Court’s willingness
to protect criminal defendants’ right to a fair trial and eliminate racial bias
and animus from the justice system.247 On the other hand, opponents fear
246. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Natalie A. Spiess, Comment, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado: A Critical, but
Incomplete, Step in the Never-Ending War on Racial Bias, 95 DENV. L. REV. 809, 836
(2018) (noting “the Court took an important step forward in the fight against racism when it
ruled that the Constitution mandates an exception to the no-impeachment rule in cases of
juror racial bias” but arguing the Court should have done more); Samuel R. Thomas,
Comment, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado: A Constitutional Battle of Public Policy, 53 GONZ.
L. REV. 355, 372 (2017) (“The traditional policies and safeguards that have long balanced
the protection of the jury with that of the defendant are not necessarily outdated, but it must
be recognized that there is a certain class of defendants that [is] still subject to significant
harm. . . . Thankfully, the Court has moved in favor of justice and equality under the law.”);
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that Peña-Rodriguez has opened Pandora’s box and will, consequently, act
as a conduit for further investigation into the deliberations of jurors.248 But
if the critics are correct—that Pandora’s box has been opened—all is not
lost.
In the Greek mythological tale, Zeus created Pandora, the first woman,
as a punishment to Prometheus for stealing fire and giving it to mortal
men.249 The gods then bestowed upon Pandora a box that contained many
evils, and they forbade her from ever opening the box.250 But Pandora was a
curious being, and one day she opened the lid of the box, and numerous
evils began spewing out into the world.251 Terrified, Pandora shut the lid
quickly, but everything had already escaped except one thing: hope.252 “It
was the only good the casket had held among the many evils, and it remains
to this day mankind’s sole comfort in misfortune.”253
The idiom “opened Pandora’s box” has come to denote an action taken
that then creates “unexpected and unwanted problems and
consequences.”254 If Peña-Rodriguez has indeed opened Pandora’s box, its
Amanda L. B. Wineman, Comment, The Invasion of Racial Bias into Jury Deliberations:
Examining Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 41 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 211, 237 (2017) (“PeñaRodriguez demonstrates the Court moving forward, making strides to overcome race-based
discrimination.”).
248. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 875 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“Today, with the admirable intention of providing justice for one criminal defendant, the
Court not only pries open the door; it rules that respecting the privacy of the jury room, as
our legal system has done for centuries, violates the Constitution.”) (emphasis added); see
also Alisa Micu, Note, Addressing Racial Bias in the Jury System: Another Failed Attempt?,
35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 843, 865 (2019) (arguing that the Supreme Court has provided an
“unworkable ruling that compromises the system more than it protects it”); Taurus Myhand,
Note, Will the Jury System Survive the Peña-Rodriguez Exception to Rule 606(b)?: The
Court’s Response to Racial Discrimination by a Juror Leaves the Future of the American
Jury Trial System in Jeopardy, 23 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 103, 123 (2018) (“Another
troubling, but likely outcome that may follow the Court’s decision in Peña-Rodriguez is
seemingly endless litigation by unsatisfied litigants seeking to undermine the jury’s
verdict.”).
249. See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY: TIMELESS TALES OF GODS AND HEROES 70
(1942). This version of Pandora’s story is recited according to Hesiod, who is considered the
“principal authority for the myths about the beginning of everything.” Id. at 63.
250. See id. at 70.
251. See id. at 70, 72.
252. See id. at 72.
253. Id.
254. OFF. OF ENG. LANGUAGE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, IN THE LOOP: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO AMERICAN ENGLISH IDIOMS 68 (1st ed. 2010), https://permanent.
access.gpo.gov/gpo46375/PDF%20version/in_the_loop_pages.pdf, adapted from SHELLEY
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goal is a hopeful one: to uphold criminal defendants’ right to a fair trial by
eradicating prejudicial bias. As Justice Kennedy pronounced in his majority
opinion, “[i]t must become the heritage of our Nation to rise above racial
classifications that are so inconsistent with our commitment to the equal
dignity of all persons.”255 But if the aim of Peña-Rodriguez is to promote
the equal dignity of all persons, why should jurisdictions implicitly permit
other forms of bias and discrimination that may be as prejudicial as racial
bias? Over one hundred years ago, the McDonald Court admonished that
“in the gravest and most important cases,” the exclusion of juror testimony
may violate “the plainest principles of justice.”256 Yet, in theory, a
defendant in Oklahoma may still be convicted because his or her religion,
sexuality, or gender played a significant role in the jury’s decision to
convict. This outcome amounts to a denial of justice and should be
rectified.
Therefore, to answer the second question posed, Oklahoma should aim
high and add a constitutional exception to Rule 2606. This resolution
incorporates the Peña-Rodriguez holding while recognizing the existence of
other pernicious forms of discrimination worthy of comparable treatment.
In adopting this approach, the state of Oklahoma would derive three
primary benefits. First, Oklahoma citizens would receive equal dignity in
trials because jurors would be able to testify about overt displays of bias or
discrimination of a suspect classification in the jury room. Second, this
amendment would warn public defenders that their clients may have some
redress and could, ultimately, provide better representation. Finally, this
amendment would encourage the fair administration of justice by requiring
jurors to decide cases based on the objective facts in the record rather than
on deep-seated biases.
The United States is a government by the people, and juries are the
epitome of that principle.257 But, because people are not perfect, juries are
not perfect. Though the law permits some imperfections in the jury system
since perfection is not possible,258 it should not condone avoidable,

VANCE LAFLIN, SOMETHING TO CROW ABOUT: A CONCISE COLLECTION OF AMERICAN
ENGLISH IDIOMS FOR EVERYDAY USE (Anna Maria Malkoç & Frank Smolinski eds., U.S.
Info. Agency 1993).
255. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 864 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915)).
257. Id. at 860 (“The jury is a tangible implementation of the principle that the law
comes from the people.”).
258. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984).
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prejudicial imperfections. Accordingly, Oklahoma lawmakers should
rectify the discrepancy in the evidence code created by Peña-Rodriguez.
VII. Conclusion
In early 2017, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in PeñaRodriguez v. Colorado effected a significant shift in the application of the
no-impeachment rule. As a result, Oklahoma’s Rule 2606(B) and its federal
counterpart have been rendered incomplete and have set a trap for the
unwary. Oklahoma lawmakers have a great opportunity to rectify this
discrepancy by providing a replicable model for other states to follow. At
the very least, lawmakers should add a racial-bias exception that mirrors the
holding language in Peña-Rodriguez. Based on the majority’s reasoning,
however, the rule may eventually be expanded to civil cases, as well as to
other forms of discrimination. Thus, Oklahoma should amend Rule 2606 by
adding a constitutional exception—thereby promoting equal dignity,
transparency, and fairness.
Ryan D. Brown
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